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LEGAL CONTROL OF BLOCKBUSTING
SUSAN SPIEGEL GLASSBERG*
As black and other non-white populations have increased in Ameri-
can cities, outward pressures for space and housing have led, not to
the dispersion and diffusion of minority groups, but to racial annexa-
tion of neighborhoods next to the ghetto. As ghettos move outward,
adjacent and previously all-white neighborhoods are first invaded by
non-white families, and then annexed to the ghetto as invasion is
followed by total racial succession. One of the factors allegedly in-
fluencing the total racial turnover of neighborhoods is blockbusting,
usually defined as a form of pressurized activity by real estate brokers
which is aimed at influencing the total racial turnover of a neighbor-
hood. To the extent that blockbusting leads to neighborhood transi-
tion and segregation, it arguably runs counter to other programs work-
ing toward racial diffusion and desegregation. This note examines the
nature of blockbusting practices, their effects on the housing supply,
and the legal controls, if any, which should be applied to achieve the
regulation if not the suppression of blockbusting practices.
I. THE NATURE OF BLOCKBUSTING
Blockbusting is a drama enacted on the block or in the neighbor-
hood, and the synopsis varies little from community to community.
The blockbuster, the principal actor, induces panic in white home-
owners by means of harassment meant to induce a rapid racial turn-
over of residences at greatly distressed prices. In its mild form, block-
busting may consist merely of excessive solicitation of sales, which
may engender panic. More severely, blockbusting can be an intensive
campaign to disseminate the rumor, based on half truths, that blacks
have purchased or will purchase a residence and that, as a result, the
neighborhood will become inundated by blacks with an accompany-
ing decline in property values and quality of housing. To substantiate
his propaganda and to heighten fear, the blockbuster may hire black
* BA., University of California at Berkeley, 1966; J.D., Washington University,
1971.
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welfare mothers to parade up and down the block" or vandals to
throw bricks through windows, 2 in order to foster the impression of a
black invasion.
The blockbusting saga typically opens in a white neighborhood
lying in the path of an expanding black ghetto. On the whole, local
realtors abstain from disrupting the homogeneity of a white neighbor-
hood by the introduction of the first black family,8 so the racial in-
tegrity of the neighborhood is generally preserved and neighborhood
turnover stagnated 4 until several blacks enter as purchasers through
outside realtors not subject to community pressures. The blockbuster
comes on the scene with prophecies of neighborhood doom, communi-
cated to homeowners by repeated telephone calls, post cards, and door-
to-door visits. In these communications he preys upon latent fears of
white homeowners, falsely representing that many neighbors have al-
ready sold to blacks or are contemplating doing so-evidenced by "sold"
and "for sale" signs placed throughout the neighborhood by the
blockbuster without the owners' consent5 or he may claim that prop-
1. Vitchek, Confessions of a Blockbuster, 235 SATURDAY EVENING POST 15, 16
(1962).
2. R. HELPER, RACIAL POLICIES AND PRACTICES OF REAL ESTATE BROK(ERS 68
(1969) [hereinafter cited as HELPER]; Richey, Kenwood Foils the Blockbusters,
227 HARPER'S MAGAZINE 42, 43 (1963) [hereinafter cited as Richey].
3. Although the Real Estate Code of Ethics advocated by the National Associa-
tion of Real Estate Boards and its state affiliates has been revised to eliminate
reference to race, most realtors continue to feel bound morally and pragmatically
to preserve the interests of white homeowners by excluding blacks from the neigh-
borhood. The original Code of Ethics stated that "[a] realtor should never be
instrumental in introducing into a neighborhood a character or property or oc-
cupancy, members of any race or nationality, or any individual whose presence
will clearly be detrimental to property values in that neighborhood." Quoted in
E. GRIER & G. GRIER, DISCRIMINATION IN HOUSING: A HANDBOOK OF FACT 15
(1960); in 1950 this code was altered to proscribe merely the introduction of a
character of property or use detrimental to property values in the neighborhood,
but realtors continue to abide by the original code. Id.; HELPER at 39, 109, 160,
201; C. TILLY, W. JACKSON, & B. KAY, RACE AND RESIDENCE IN WILMINGTON,
DELAWARE 42 (1965).
Realtors feel strongly that policies of racial exculsion are on the highest ethical
plane because realtors are thereby preserving the American way, avoiding racial
disharmony and preventing economic and social harm to white homeowners in the
community. HELPER at 117, 140. Furthermore, the white homeowners constitute
potential future customers and the realtor must act to protect his reputation. Many
realtors have expressed personal as well as business reasons in opposition to inte-
gration. Id. at 130.
4. HELPER at 35.
5. E.g., M. Price, Southern Regional Council Neighborhoods-Where Human
Relations Begin 30 (1967) (Urban Planning Project no. 4 of So. Reg. Council)
[hereinafter cited as Southern Regional Council].
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erty values are plummeting, and that the property owner should sell
quickly before it is "too late."r,
In the earlier years of blockbusting, the blockbuster reaped substan-
tial gain, especially if he took a house for resale rather than as a mere
listing. The ready cash 7 offered by the blockbuster induced many
desperate howeowners to sell, even at greatly depressed prices, in order
to avoid further loss.8 Yet, in resales to blacks who were eager to es-
cape the ghetto, the blockbuster received amounts exceeding the fair
market value of the residences. Moreover, sales were frequently made
to poor blacks,9 who accumulated funds for housing payments by sub-
dividing residences into units leased on a room basis, dearly in viola-
tion of local zoning laws,10 and contributing to the decline of the
neighborhood. Inevitably, no funds would remain for maintenance
purposes, thus leading to further deterioration of buildings.'
Current blockbusting practice relies less on flagrant harassment and
6. In reality, prices may actually rise following black entry because of the
willingness of blacks to pay a premium to escape the ghetto. HZLPER at 86; E.
Smolensky, S. Becker, & H. Molotch, The Prisoner's Dilemma and Ghetto Ex-
pansion, 44 LA,'D EcoN. 419 (1968).
7. Financial institutions generally consider changing neighborhoods as bad credit
areas, so that potential purchasers are unable to secure financing for purchases
there. Because the blockbuster could recoup his expenses from payments by the
black purchaser, he was willing to pay a premium for heavy mortgaging on these
risky properties. By doing so he was able to keep his money out of the dealings,
and thereby had capital to offer the desperate sellers when no one else was able to
make similar financial arrangements. Gannon, Spotlight on Blockbusting, 120
AmrRICA 563, 564 (1969); Richey at 46; H. Sanoff, M. Sawhney, K. Burgwyn, &
G Ellinwood, Residential Patterns of Racial Change: A Study of a Southern City,
July 1970. For an analysis of mortgaging practices of blockbusters see W. Lehman,
Mortgage Availability in Racially Transitional Areas, Report of Chicago Commis-
sion on Human Relations, Aug. 2, 1962.
8. Of course, loss is not actually experienced until the sale is made for less
than the fair market value. If the homeowner were willing to wait for property
values to stabilize he might suffer no loss at all.
9. Alternatively, the blockbuster may subdivide the residences himself and rent
to poor blacks on a weekly basis.
10. The blockbuster retains title so that if a payment is missed he may re-
possess the house for "resale" on a contract basis to another illiterate black. Richey
at 44; Southern Regional Council at 2, 30. These long-term sales contracts may
include provisions allowing the contract holder (the blockbuster) to remodel or
repaint at any time, adding the cost thereof to the contract cost.
11. This inability properly to maintain the property reinforces the stereotype
that blacks always let their property run down and are poor housekeepers. See
Southern Regional Council.
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speculation and more on subtler tactics,1 2 predominantly representa-
tions regarding the "changing neighborhood," often without reference
to race. To insure the turnover of the neighborhood, the blockbuster
also discourages potential white purchasers, showing available listings
only to blacks.1 s Although the profits are not as great as on resales,
the high turnover rate assures substantial earnings in the form of
commissions.14 Each sale accelerates the turnover rate by giving cre-
dence to a prophecy which has become self-fulfilling. The blockbust-
ing campaign ends with the annexation of the neighborhood to the
ghetto, continued segregation, the involuntary relocation of former
white residents, and the infusion of new life into stereotypes and
prejudices about racial minorities.
II. REASONS FOR THE CONTROL OF BLOCKBUSTING
Because blockbusting has such a negative impact on cities, many
governmental bodies-at the federal, state, and local levels-have
adopted anti-blockbusting measures through legislation and adminis-
trative regulations. These controls usually have one or more of the
following purposes: (1) preventing discrimination and the creation
of ghettoes; 15 (2) promoting fairness in real estate transactions;1 6 and
(3) promoting community stability and interracial harmony.17 These
12. Note, Blockbusting, 59 GEo. L.J. 170, 171 (1970) [hereinafter cited as
Blockbusting]; Interview with Hedy Epstein, Greater St. Louis Committee for
Freedom of Residence, in St. Louis, Missouri, January 1971 [hereinafter cited as
Epstein interview].
13. C. RApKxI & W. GRXGSBY, THE DEMAND FOR HOUSING IN RACIALLY MDCED
AEAs-A STUDY OF THE NATURE OF NEIGHBORHOOD CHANGE 46 (1960) (here-
inafter cited as RAPIN & GRiGsBY]; Southern Regional Council at 30.
14. Even in the absence of speculation gross profits on sales to blacks have been
known to be double that of sales to whites. RAPrIN & GRIOSBY at 112. During a
blockbusting episode in Chicago, resale prices exceeded fair market value by 28.5
to 118 per cent. Note, Civil Rights Policy in the Federal System: Proposals lor a
Better Use of Administrative Process, 74 YALE L.J. 1171, 1208 (1965).
15. A number of fair housing laws include anti-blockbusting provisions. E.g.,
KAN. STAT. ANN. § 44-1016 (Supp. 1971); ALEXANDRIA, VA., CODE § 17A-4
(1969). Some laws refer specifically to the association between blockbusting and
the creation of ghettos. E.g., MID. ANN. CODE art. 56, § 230B (Supp. 1970);
Teaneck, N.J., Ordinance 1274 (1966).
16. E.g., MAD. ANN. CODE art. 56, § 230B (Supp. 1970); LAws OF N.Y. ch.
493, tit. C, § C 1-1.0 (May 8, 1970). See 112 CONG. REc. 18177 (1966) (remarks
of Congressman Bingham, who introduced the anti-blockbusting amendment).
17. LAws OF N.Y. ch. 493, tit. C, § 1-1.0 (May 8, 1970); Teaneck, N.J.,
Ordinance 1274 (1966).
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purposes and their relation to blockbusting practices will be examined
briefly.
It has been shown that blockbusting converts a potentially inte-
grated neighborhood into a ghetto, and may be condemned for fur-
thering the cause of discrimination. However, it may be that the onus
on blockbusters is misplaced. Instead, it is possible that the neighbor-
hood never had a potential for stable integration, and that resegrega-
tion would occur even in the absence of intervention by the block-
buster, in response to white prejudices or other factors.
Racial prejudice may be a dominant operative factor in resegrega-
tion, yet evidence from observation of transitional neighborhoods
indicates that it is not the sole determinant of neighborhood racial
transformation. Whites may choose to move from a neighborhood
because of race or class prejudice against their new black neighbors
or because of changes in community services resulting from changes
in the composition of the population.' s Alternatively, whites may
move for reasons wholly unrelated to race or race prejudice. 9
If, in the course of normal neighborhood mobility, whites move out
and blacks begin to fill resultant vacancies, the neighborhood will
eventually become all black without the intervention of a block-
buster.20 The absence of blockbusting, however, does not signify that
real estate operators are not engaged in a policy of selective showing,2'
which might be the cause for the filling of vacancies by blacks only.
That is, real estate brokers to whom whites normally turn for assistance
may simply not show homes in racially changing neighborhoods.
Technically, this practice is not blockbusting, but it assists the forces
18. RAPKIN & GRIGSBY at 19; Marcus, Racial Composition and Home Price
Changes: A Case Study, 32 J. Am. INST. PLANNERS 334 (1968).
19. Fishman, Some Social and Psychological Determinants of Intergroup Rela-
tions in Changing Neighborhoods: An Introduction to the Bridgeview Study, 40
SOCIAL FORCES 42, 45 (1961). The "mobility wish" evidenced by "for sale"
signs, -%as equal in integrating and non-integrating neighborhoods. Even the oc-
currence of a racial incident did not accelerate turnover in the integrating neighbor-
hood. Molotch, Racial Change in a Stable Community, 75 Am. J. SOCIOLOGY 226
(1969).
20. M. GROZINS. THE METROPOLITAN\ AREA AS A RACIAL PROBLEM 6 (1958);
Molotch, Racial Change in a Stable Community, 75 Am. J. SOCIOLOGY 226, 227
(1969).
21. Realtors show listings in changing areas only to blacks and refuse to show
them to whites. Concurrently, listings in non-changing neighborhoods are shown
only to whites and not to blacks. This selective showing often occurs despite ex-
plicit requests by the potential buyer to see residences in the particular area.
Epstein interview.
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working toward total racial secession. Real estate operators contend
that whites are disinterested in purchasing in changing areas, so that
selective showing only avoids wasting time.22 Contrary to this assess-
ment, there is evidence that whites will purchase in mixed areas, at-
tracted by considerations of location, design, and economy,23 although
it is true that purchases by whites may not be made adjacent to resi-
dences owned by blacks. 24
The proximity factor may offer explanation for the operation of
the "tipping mechanism." The "tipping point" of a neighborhood
constitutes that number of black entries to the neighborhood which
overcomes the tolerance of white homeowners for black neighbors and
causes them to move away. Whether the white exodus reflects the
operation of such a "tipping mechanism" or whether white departures
merely increase with an increasing rate of black entries, 25 it is clear
that after the entry of a substantial number of black families propin-
quity is unavoidable and fewer whites will enter.2
It might then be concluded that the mass exodus of whites prere-
quisite to neighborhood racial change does not ordinarily occur upon
the mere entry of several blacks. In most cases, significant inertia
must be overcome before a homeowner will act rather than remain
passive.27 Unless a homeowner has already begun to feel dissatisfac-
tion with his neighborhood or residence, he is most likely to remain
upon the entry of blacks, at least until the forces holding him to that
22. Even where these predictions of prejudice are contradicted by requests for
listing in the mixed area, realtors are likely to continue to refuse to show such
listings. Realtors, then, are quite prominent in directing the influx of purchasers
into any neighborhood. See Detroit Comm'n on Community Relations, A Pre-
liminary Report on the Public Hearings to Evaluate the Effectiveness of the FNPO
[Fair Neighborhood Practices Ordinance] in Dealing With the Continuing Process
of Neighborhood Resegregation 4, April 21, 1966 [hereinafter cited as Detroit
Comm'n on Community Relations]. Many real estate firms dealing predominantly
with whites may cease dealing in a changing neighborhood. Id.
23. A. Pascal, The Analysis of Residential Segregation 26, Oct. 1969; The
Potomac Institute, Housing Guide to Equal Opportunity, 1968.
24. RAPN & GsuosBy at 46.
25. M. GRODZINS, THE METRoPOLITAN AREA AS A RACIAL PROBLEi 6 (1958);
Stinchcombe, McDill, & Walker, Is There a Racial Tipping Point in Changing
Schools?, 25 J. SOCIAL IssuEs 127 (1969).
26. A. TAEUBER & K. TARuBER, NEGROES IN CITIES; RESIDENTIAL SEOREGA-
TION AND NEIGHBORHOOD CHANGE 100 (1965). The authors indicate that re-
segregation is often seen as an irreversible process, that once blacks begin to enter
a neighborhood, it will continually become more and more black.
27. RAPKIN & GRIGSBY at 19.
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place of residence diminish substantially.28 Moreover, when affirmative
steps have been taken to attract whites to mixed neighborhoods, stable
integration patterns have resulted.-9 In the absence of such action,
black entry has only foreshadowed resegregation; this may be a
natural phenomenon reflecting white prejudice. Blockbusting only
hastens its occurrence, and should not bear all the blame for that
process. However, inasmuch as blockbusting does help lead to segrega-
tion patterns, the prevention of discrimination is a legitimate justifica-
tion for anti-blockbusting measures.10
A second purpose advanced for anti-blockbusting measures is the
prevention of economic exploitation in real estate dealings. The moti-
vation of the blockbuster is simply to maximize profits regardless of
social consequences. That white homeowners are often victimized by
their own prejudice- and ignorance does not justify the enrichment of
the blockbuster at their expense. W\rhat happens is that the block-
buster artificially inflates the supply of residences on the market.
When the blockbuster is a speculator he purchases at distressed prices,
and then resells to blacks at inflated price levels. Both the white home-
owner and the black purchaser are economic losers-receiving too
little and paying too much. Even if the blockbuster does not pur-
chase for resale, his activities have the purpose of churning the mar-
ket for his own benefit. Patterns of activity leading to market manipu-
lation are also arguably subject to public control.
Finally, blockbusting controls are advocated for the purpose of
avoiding community instability and racial tension. A particularly
destructive, though intangible, consequence of blockbusting is its
perpetuation of the myth that the entry of blacks automatically de-
flates property values and deteriorates the social fabric of the neighbor-
hood. Although effect on property values is highly controverted by
28. Id.
29. E.g., The Potomac Institute, Housing Guide to Equal Opportunity, 1968;
Molotch, Racial Change in a Stable Community, 75 Am. J. SoCIoLoGY 226, 227
(1969).
30. In discussing the federal anti-blockbusting provision, Senator Mondale re-
lated blockbusting prevention to open housing in that price declines constitute a
major argument against fair housing legislation and blockbusting is a cause of
property value decline. 113 CoNo. Rzc. 22841 (1967).
31. Households vary in bigotry level and their resultant housing decisions. A.
Pascal, The Analysis of Residential Segregation 22, Oct. 1969; Blockbusting at
175.
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social scientists, 32 the activities of the blockbuster transform the stereo-
type into a self-fulfilling prophecy. Few whites realize they are being
manipulated by the blockbuster,33 because the realtor is the acknowl-
edged expert on property values and it is, therefore, reasonable to
give credence to his assessment.34 As events corroborate the block-
buster's prediction, his statements assume increasingly greater validity;
the stereotype becomes fact. Families and individuals who move under
pressure from transitional areas may take stereotyped attitudes toward
non-whites with them. On the other hand, the black again feels re-
jected and denied his individual worth; he resents being put back into
the ghetto once again.35 Not only is community unrest created, but
the opportunity for successful integration is further postponed by in-
tensifying fears and the resistance to open housing.
Apart from the effects on individual neighborhoods, the impact of
blockbusting on social attitudes and community tension also consti-
tute sufficient reason to impose negative sanctions on blockbusting
practices.
III. CONTROL OF BLOCKBUSTING
While informal controls in the form of community resistance
through neighborhood organizations have been effective in many
instances,36 this paper focuses on formal controls imposed by govern-
32. L. LAURENTI, PROPERTY VALUES AND RACE; STUDIES IN SEVEN CITIES
(1960); A. Pascal, The Analysis of Residential Segregation 23-25, Oct. 1969;
Marcus, Racial Composition and Home Price Changes: A Case Study, 32 3. AM.
INST. PLANNERS 334 (1968); Ladd, The Effect of Integration on Property Values,
52 Am. EcoN. Rv. 801 (1962); E. Smolensky, S. Becker, & H. Molotch, The
Prisoner's Dilemma and Ghetto Expansion, 44 LAND ECON. 419 (1968).
33. H. Singer, How We Beat the Blockbusters, 241 SATURDAY EVENING POST
50 (1968).
34. The average citizen knows little about real estate despite the fact that in
most families the residence is the largest household investment. His lack of exper-
tise compels the homeowner or potential homeowner to rely heavily upon the
opinions and evaluations of the realtor. D. Hempel, The Role of the Real Estate
Broker in the Home Buying Process 24, in Real Estate Reports No. 7, 1969
(Univ. of Conn. Center for Real Estate and Urban Economic Studies); Austin,
Real Estate Boards and Multiple Listing Systems as Restraints of Trade, 70
COLUM. L. REv. 1325, 1327 (1970).
35. Individually, the black homeowners in a changing neighborhood have more
at stake than the white homeowners: "When white people are forced out by slums,
they have a choice of places to go. We don't. We can only keep moving just
ahead of the slum .... ." Richey at 45.
36. For a description of some of the successful neighborhood organizations and
the techniques used see Southern Regional Council.
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mental bodies. Substantively, formal anti-blockbusting measures fall
within three major classifications: (1) control of representations, (2)
control of solicitations, and (3) control of conduct.
A. Control of Representations
1. Federal Control
The most common legal treatment of blockbusting proscribes speci-
fied representations which comprise an essential component of the
practice. The federal anti-blockbusting provision, section 3604 (e) of
the 1968 Civil Rights Act,-- adopts this approach in declaring it to be
unlawful
[Ifor profit, to induce or attempt to induce any person to sell or
rent any dwelling by representations regarding the entry or pros-
pective entry into the neighborhood of a person or persons of a
particular race, color, religion, or national origin38
To be actionable under the statute, the representations need not be
successful in inducing sales or rentals, for the statute equally pro-
scribes representations made in attempts to induce with those made
in successful inducements."' As one court has pointed out, "The con-
duct condemned and the responsibility placed by the statute on the
agent is to refrain absolutely from any such representations."40
Upon the occurrence of a violation under section 3604 (e), a private
citizen may initiate the control process by (1) filing a complaint with
the Department of Housing and Urban Development (HUD) under
section 3610 (a);"1 or (2) bringing a civil action against the block-
buster in court under section 3612 (a) .42 The individual choosing to
proceed through HUD must be a "person aggrieved"-defined as a
person who has suffered injury or who anticipates irrevocable injury
due to the unlawful blockbusting practices. 43 There is no similar re-
37. 42 U.S.C. §§ 3601 et seq. (1970). The exemption in the Fair Housing title
for single-family residences sold or rented by the owner has been held inapplicable
to the blockbusting provision because the exemption would enervate that section.
United States v. Mintzes, 304 F. Supp. 1305 (D. Md. 1969).
38. 42 U.S.C. § 3604(e) (1970).
39. Brown v. State Realty Co., 304 F. Supp. 1236, 1241 (N.D. Ga. 1969).
40. Id.
41. 42 U.S.C. § 3610(a) (1970).
-12. Id. § 3612(a).
43. Id. § 3610(a).
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striction on plaintiffs who may bring a civil action under section 3612.
The definition of "person aggrieved" is sufficiently broad to afford
relief to both homeowners and prospective purchasers, black and white.
However, the requirement of actual or potential personal harm
greatly constricts the class which may file complaints. 44 Relief has
been granted despite the absence of actual harm to the plaintiffs or
actual profit to the blockbusters45 when the case was instituted under
section 3612, but it is unlikely to be given in a proceeding under sec-
tion 3610 because of the definition of "person aggrieved." This differ-
ence in the required showing of harm results in a variance in proof
problems which is likely to affect the individual's choice of procedure.
Under the section 8610 procedure, HUD must investigate the com-
plaint and notify the complainant within thirty days as to what
course of action, if any, it intends to undertake.4 When state or local
law provides substantially equivalent remedies, HUD must first refer
the complaint to a state or local authority; HUD's thirty-day investi-
gative period does not begin until the state or local authority has had
thirty days in which to respond and has failed to do so.47 During this
period, the complainant is barred from bringing suit against the block-
buster,48 although the blockbuster is not barred from continuing his
activities because HUD lacks the power to issue either temporary
restraining or cease and desist orders.49
If HUD finally decides to proceed with the complaint, it must obey
a statutory preference for informal settlement and attempt to resolve
the complaint through conference, conciliation, and persuasion. 00
Failure to secure voluntary compliance by the end of the thirty-day
period (voluntary compliance is unlikely to be obtained from the
blockbuster) - revives the complainant's right to institute a civil ac-
44. Harm may often be indirect such as the disadvantages resulting from segre-
gated housing. See Blockbusting at 176. The likelihood of a court recognizing
such harm is slight.
45. Brown v. State Realty Co., 304 F. Supp. 1236, 1241 (N.D. Ga. 1969).
46. 42 U.S.C. § 3610(a) (1970).
47. Id. § 3610(c).
48. Id. § 3610(d).
49. The bill originally granted these powers to HUD, but they were removed
by the Dirksen amendment. See Blockbusting at 177 & n.60.
50. 42 U.S.C. § 3610(a) (1970).
51. "It is impossible that one who knowingly violates the law for profit will be
dissuaded by moralizations unaccompanied by the threat of economic or criminal
sanction." Blockbusting at 178. Rather, it is argued, unlike the person dis-
criminating against a black without awareness of the illegality of his action who
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tion.5 2 This right does not carry with it as many benefits as the right
to bring suit without first proceeding through HUD under section
3612. Relief in a successful suit following HUD investigation is limited
to injunction and "such affirmative action as may be appropriate. 5 13
In a suit brought without HUD intervention under section 3612 the
court may grant temporary injunctions, permanent injunctions, tem-
porary restraining orders, actual damages, punitive damages up to
$1,000, and court costs and reasonable attorney fees.54 In addition, al-
though the complainant under the HUD provision is barred from
federal court if "substantially equivalent" rights and remedies exist
at the state or local level, 55 under section 3612 he is unaffected by
provisions in other legal systems. In light of the great discrepancy in
protection and relief between the two actions, the choice of any com-
plaining party appears to be predetermined. Why the drafters incor-
porated a statutory preference for avoidance of the administrative
procedure is far from dear.
Litigants under section 3610 are not disadvantaged with respect to
jurisdiction; both sections 3610 and 3612 confer federal court jurisdic-
tion without regard to the amount in controversy. In a federal district
court proceeding under section 3612, the statutory basis for federal
jurisdiction was challenged.56 Both the commerce clause and the
fourteenth amendment of the United States Constitution were re-
jected as support, the court relying on the thirteenth amendment as
interpreted by Jones v. Alfred H. Mayer Company. 7 a United States
Supreme Court case. In this case it was held that private as well as
public discrimination with respect to the sale or rental of real property
is barred by the Civil Rights Act of 1866, which was in turn upheld
as a statutory implementation of the thirteenth amendment.58 Accord-
ingly, inasmuch as blockbusting activities interfere with the rights
may cooperate to avoid the embarassment of litigation, the blockbuster knows his
actions to be illegal and cherishes the notoriety which bestows greater fear value
to his presence in a neighborhood. Id.
52. 42 U.S.C. § 3610(d) (1970).
53. Id.
54. Id. § 3612(c).
55. Id. § 3610(d).
56. Brown v. State Realty Co., 304 F. Supp. 1236 (N.D. Ga. 1969).
57. 392 U.S. 409 (1968).
58. 42 U.S.C. § 1982 (1970).
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granted by the 1866 Civil Rights Act,59 it constitutes a federal ques-
tion amenable to resolution in a federal court.
As an additional remedy under the federal statute, the United
States Justice Department may seek injunctive relief against persons
believed to be engaged in the practice of blockbusting.00 The Depart-
ment must have reasonable cause to believe that unlawful blockbust-
ing is occurring, but the basis for that finding need not be specified.0 '
Although the additional requirement that there be evidence of a
"pattern or practice" of blockbusting may be difficult to fulfill,02 proof
of blockbusting patterns should not be too difficult in most instances.
All but one 3 of the cases filed under the federal law have been
filed by the Justice Department. This trend most probably reflects
the greater familiarity of the Justice Department with the anti-block-
busting provision. 64 Public discussion concerning the enactment of
the Fair Housing Law centered on the conflict between property rights
and fair housing policies,65 so that few members of the general public
may be aware of the existence of the anti-blockbusting provision in
that statute. Possibly for that reason, few private actions have been
brought, even under section 3612.
In the cases which have considered what forms of blockbusting are
actionable under the statute, it has been held that the representations
need not (1) be false, 86 (2) be successful in inducing sales or ren-
59. But see Blockbusting at 183. This article points to the difficulty of sustain-
ing the anti-blockbusting provision under the thirteenth amendment when actions
are brought by white plaintiffs.
60. 42 U.S.C. § 3613 (1970). Because of the resources and the continuing
interest in compliance of the Justice Department, that department is more likely
to supervise compliance than an individual homeowner whose interest wanes as
soon as the blockbusting ceases to pose a threat to him personally.
61. United States v. Mitchell, 313 F. Supp. 299 (N.D. Ga. 1970).
62. What activity suffices to constitute a "pattern or practice" has not been fully
determined. "Pattern or practice" has been determined to consist generally of re-
peated, routine, regularly engaged-in acts. United States v. Gray, 315 F. Supp. 13
(D.R.I. 1970). But a more specific standard has not been expounded. "The num-
ber of incidents necessary to show a pattern or practice depends on the nature of
the right protected and the nature of the ordinary violations of such right." United
States v. Mintzes, 304 F. Supp. 1305, 1314 (D. Md. 1969).
63. Brown v. State Realty Co., 304 F. Supp. 1236 (N.D. Ga. 1969).
64. Action by the Justice Department avoids the prohibitive cost of civil actions
and the ineffectiveness of conciliation in cases like these. United States v. Mintzes,
304 F. Supp. 1305, 1314 (D. Md. 1969).
65. See 113 CONo. REc. 22841 (1967).
66. United States v. Mintzes, 304 F. Supp. 1305, 1309 (D. Md. 1969).
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tals,! or (3) refer directly to blacks or other minorities.6s Although
the statute makes no reference to the truth or falsity of the statements,
a federal district court in United States v. Mintzes did state that
"representations, whether true or false" are prohibited.69 If truth is
not a defense 0 to an action under the statute, there may be constitu-
tional protests on the basis of the first amendment right of freedom
of expression. However, the requirement that statements be made "for
profit" activates the commercial exception to first amendment protec-
tion,"' for where speech is regulated in a commercial context, the
Supreme Court has held the protections of the first amendment in-
applicable.-, The first amendment does not provide the same degree
of protection to activity which is purely commercial 7 3 because "it
does not affect the political process, does not contribute to the ex-
change of ideas, does not provide information on matters of public
importance, and is not.., a form of individual self-expression."7 4
Not only is commercial expression not highly valued, but one federal
district court has exalted the prevention of discrimination to the pre-
ferred position generally occupied by first amendment freedoms.7 5
Despite the explicit statutory proscription of representations, this
court held that the statute regulates conduct, the inhibiting effect on
67. Brown v. State Realty Co., 304 F. Supp. 1236, 1241 (N.D. Ga. 1969).
68. See United States v. Mintzes, 304 F. Supp. 1305, 1311 (D. Md. 1969).
69. Id.
70. Truth has been held a defense in several state proceedings under similar
provisions. See Abel v. Lomenzo, 25 App. Div. 2d 104, 267 N.Y.S.2d 265 (1966).
There, in annulling a license suspension for representations to prospective white
purchasers regarding the racial composition of the area, the court held that the
sole purpose of the blockbusting rule is to prevent cheating the homeowner by in-
ducing him to sell. Conveying accurate information for the purpose of trans-
forming the racial composition of the neighborhood apparently did not violate the
rule. The truth of his statements was held to insulate the broker's free speech
right. See H. Singer, How We Beat the Blockbusters, 241 SATURDAY EVENING
POST 50 (1968).
71. See United States v. Mintzes, 304 F. Supp. 1305, 1312 (D. Md. 1969).
72. Breard v. City of Alexandria, 341 U.S. 622 (1951).
73. George R. Whitten, Jr., Inc. v. Paddock Pool Builders, 424 F.2d 25 (1st
Cir. 1970). Although the veracity of political, social, or religious communications
does not affect protection by the first amendment, exception is made for misleading
or fraudulent commercial representations because they are deemed to be, like
obscenity, utterly without redeeming social value. Note, Freedom of Expression in
a Commercial Context, 78 1Riv. L. Rev. 1191, 1197 (1965).
74. Banzhaf v. FCC, 405 F.2d 1082, 1101-02 (D.C. Cir. 1968).
75. United States v. Bob Lawrence Realty, Inc., 313 F. Supp. 870 (N.D. Ga.
1970). However, this was not a final disposition of the case, but only a judgment
on motions and therefore a different interpretation might be elicited by treatment
on the merits.
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speech being merely incidental thereto and justifiable because of the
purposes of the statute in preventing discrimination. Similarly, courts
have denied protection to speech forming an integral part of conduct
which is otherwise illegal70 or constituting propaganda against re-
ligious or racial groups.77
What constitutes commercial activity triggering the commercial ex-
ception has not been dearly resolved. Although one district court
excluded evidence of honest representations made in response to ques-
tions as falling outside the commercial exception and therefore pro-
tectable by the first amendment,78 another court held that agents must
absolutely refrain from making representations regardless of whether
inquiry by the property owner provoked the response.70 Apparently
one court regards only the communication itself as determining the
applicability of the commercial exception, while the other regards the
relationship between the agent and the potential seller as determina-
tive. Blockbusting predominantly involves the making of uninvited
representations; therefore, even if the stricter conceptualization of
commercial context prevails, most cases against blockbusters will fall
within the commercial exception.
Although the representation must be "for profit" in order to be
outside constitutional immunity, it need not actually yield a profit
through the successful inducement of sales or rentals. The statute pro-
scribes both representations made in attempts to induce sales or ren-
tals and those made in successful inducements. 80 "The conduct con-
demned and the responsibility placed by the statute on the agent is
to refrain absolutely from any such representations."81
There are some other substantive elements in the federal statute.
For example, the prohibited representations need not refer directly
to blacks or other minority groups. They may consist of comments
76. Blockbusting has been termed the "handmaiden" of other illicit discrimina-
tory practices. See, e.g., Chicago Real Estate Bd. v. City of Chicago, 36 Ill. 2d
530, 553, 224 N.E.2d 793, 807 (1967). Cf. Giboney v. Empire Storage & Ice Co.,
336 U.S. 490 (1949).
77. Beauharnais v. Illinois, 343 U.S. 250 (1952).
78. United States v. Mintzes, 304 F. Supp. 1305, 1312 (D. Md. 1969).
79. Brown v. State Realty Co., 304 F. Supp. 1236, 1241 (N.D. Ga. 1969).
Accord, 69 Op. AT'y GEN. 263 (Cal. 1970). The state attorney general con-
cluded that furnishing information about the racial background of a prospective
purchaser to an owner, whether or not in response to a question by the owner, is
an unlawful discriminatory practice.
80. See 42 U.S.C. § 3604(e) (1970).
81. Brown v. State Realty Co., 304 F. Supp. 1236, 1241 (N.D. Ga. 1969).
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on the "changing neighborhood," "undesirable elements," fear of
crime in the neighborhood, and declining property values, which are
but thinly veiled remarks on the racial transition and are intelligible
both to speaker and listener.82 Although these subtle communications
do not technically fall within the ambit of a prohibition of represen-
tations regarding racial change, one district court enlarged the ap-
plicability of the statute to include them.8 3
2. Non-federal Controls
Like the federal government, the majority of states, municipalities,
and regulatory commissions attempting to curb blockbusting pro-
scribe representations made to induce neighborhood change, often
describing more specifically than does the federal statute the represen-
tations prohibited. These statutes generally proscribe one or more of
the following representations about a specific neighborhood: (1) a
decline in property values, (2) a change in its racial, ethnic, or re-
ligious composition, (3) an increase in crime and anti-social behavior,
or (4) a decline in the quality of schools and other public facilities.-s
Provisions of this kind appear in several state statutes and a variety of
municipal ordinances.8 5 In addition, regulations of state real estate
agencies may prohibit blockbusting practices, though some of these
may do so only through a generalized prohibition of deception and
misrepresentation.86
Although the federal statute dearly limits its applicability to indi-
viduals making such representations with an expectation of financial
gain, a slight majority of the state statutes and municipal ordinances
recognize that other persons or organizations may be instrumental in
activating the resegregation process. 7 Under such statutes and ordi-
82. Blockbusters today resort to these subtler communications. See note 12
supra and accompanying text.
83. United States v. Mintzes, 304 F. Supp. 1305, 1311 (D. Md. 1969).
84. Several states expressly prohibit indirect as well as direct references to
neighborhood transition. See, e.g., MicH. STAT. ANN. § 26.1300(203) (1970).
85. Eg., MINN. STAT. ANN. § 363.03(2) (4) (Supp. 1971); OHio Rav. CODE.
AN-N. § 4112.02 (Supp. 1970).
86. Such conduct generally forms grounds for license suspension or revocation.
See, e.g.. MAss. ANN. LAWS ch. 112, § 87AAA (1965); Mo. REv. STAT. §
339.100(1) (1966). Provisions relating to unfair or dishonest dealings may be
held applicable to blockbuster realtors. Letter from John Ball, Director, Kansas
Real Estate Commission, to author, October 14, 1970.
87. Realtors assert that black militants are instrumental in blockbusting cam-
paigns, in that these groups want the neighborhoods to "turn" and accordingly
send workers into the white community in order to disrupt it. HELPER at 172.
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nances, which prohibit representations by "any person,"88 not only
the realtor but even black action groups or simply malicious individ-
uals may be subject to sanctions. Although representations by individ-
uals made without an expectation of profit fall outside the commercial
exception to the first amendment, regulation of these representations
is not necessarily precluded by the first amendment because of an addi-
tional exception for racial propaganda and speech connected to illegal
behavior.8 9 Furthermore, a broad interpretation of the commercial
context exception might encompass utterances made for the purpose
of inducing sales or rentals of residential real estate, even in the ab-
sence of profit.
State and local prohibitions of blockbusting representations also
differ from the federal statute in the type of sanctions imposed. An
administrative procedure closely parallel to the federal procedure is
found in the State of New York, except that there is no provision for
intervention on its own motion by the state attorney general.9 0 Al-
though under the federal statute the injunction has been the most
frequently relied upon remedy (and is probably the most effective),
reliance on injunctive relief has not been typical at state and local
levels. 9 .
Unlike the federal scheme, the provision of civil remedies is un-
common at the state or local level. Only New York State provides
injured parties a cause of action against the blockbuster,9 2 and this
statute is limited to New York City. Under the New York statute re-
covery extends to all gains, including profits and commissions, realized
by the blockbuster on the sale of the plaintiff's property, or, in the
88. ILL. ANN. STAT. ch. 38, § 70-51(b)-(c) (Smith-Hurd Supp. 1971); MD.
ANN. CODE art 56, § 230A (Supp. 1970); OHIo REv. CODE ANN. § 4112.02
(H)(9) (1970); Wis. STAT. ANN. § 101.60(2m) (Supp. 1971); ANNAPOLIS,
M., CITY CODE § 8-3(a)(5) (1970); BUFFALO, N.Y., ORDINANCE § 350
(1970); DETROIT, MICH., CODE § 39-1-13.1 (1970); EVANSTON, ILL., CODE §
25-1/2-6 (1970); GREEN BAY, Wis., CODE OF GEN. ORDINANCES ch. 32.05
(1968); Oklahoma City, Okla., Ordinance 11,848 (1969); Teaneck, N.J., Ordi-
nance 1274 (1966).
89. See, e.g., Beauharnais v. Illinois, 343 U.S. 250 (1952); Chaplinsky v. New
Hampshire, 315 U.S. 568 (1942).
90. N.Y. Exc. LAw § 297 (McKinney Supp. 1970); see also ANNAPOLIS, MD.,
CODE § 8-6 (1970).
91. However, injunctive relief is provided in some municipalities and states.
See, e.g., KAN. STAT. ANN. § 44-1022 (Supp. 1971); N.Y. Exnc. LAw § 297(6)
(McKinney Supp. 1970); ALEXANDRIA, VA., CODE § 17A-4 (1969); GREEN BAY,
WIsC., CODE OF GEN. ORDINANCES ch. 32.05 (1968).
92. LAws OF N.Y. ch. 493, tit. C (May 8, 1970).
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absence of such gains, the difference between the price for which the
plaintiff sold his property and its fair market value at the time of the
sale or at the time of the suit, whichever is greater. 93 The basis for
suit is the previous occurrence of blockbusting activities, primarily
representations made both to induce sales and to discourage pur-
chases.9 4 Since the principal objective of the blockbuster is to maxi-
mize profits, taking that profit away from him (and even taxing him
court costs as well) should inhibit his motivation to engage in block-
busting activities,95 particularly since under the New York scheme
he may face criminal charges also. 96 The practice simply becomes un-
profitable and too costly for him to pursue. The civil remedy, there-
fore, has a dual impact: (1) it provides a meaningful deterrent by
eliminating the profit from blockbusting, and (2) it provides restitu-
tion to the victim. The effectiveness may be questioned, however,
in light of the experience with private action under the federal
statute.
In most jurisdictions, relief is limited either to criminal sanctions,
real estate license regulation or both, neither of which is available at
the federal level. Criminal prosecution may result in a sentence of
imprisonment up to a year and/or a fine up to a maximum of $1,000
in several states.5 7 Although the threat of incarceration might have
93. This second measure of damages is particularly significant in light of the
current trend of blockbusters not to engage in speculation.
94. A similar cause of action is provided the purchaser of real property which
was sold in response to blockbusting. The statute does not prohibit damages
against the blockbuster by both the seller and the purchaser; however, it is to be
anticipated that the gain will be split between them in the case of joint action
against the blockbuster. There is no record at this time of civil actions under this
statute.
95. Jerris Leonard, assistant attorney general for civil rights, has been quoted
as regarding the key to blockbusting control to lie in squeezing the profit out of it
by giving relief to blockbusting victims. Los Angeles Times, February 22, 1969.
42 U.S.C. § 3612(c) (1970) authorizes punitive damages in addition to actual
damages and punitive damages of $750 were awarded in Brown v. State Realty
Co, 304 F. Supp. 1236 (N.D. Ga. 1969). The value of specific monetary damages
as distinguished from punitive damages is questioned in Blockbusting at 180 be-
cause of the difficulty in ascertaining for proof purposes the fair market value and
the deviation therefrom. It is predicted that (1) courts will be reluctant to give
damage awards, and (2) blockbusters will regard the damages as a minor contribu-
tion to overhead expenses. Id.
96. LAws oF N.Y. ch. 493, tit. C, § Cl-7.0 (May 8, 1970).
97. E.g., AID. ANN. CoDE art. 56, § 230A (1968) ($500/1 year); Wis. STAT.
ANN. § 101.60(6) (Supp. 1971) ($10-$200). Michigan doubles the fine for the
second offense. Mia. STAT. ANN. § 26.1300 (412) (1970). For the second of-
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some impact on the blockbuster's behavior, the prospect of paying
even a $1,000 fine can have little significance in view of the substan-
tial profits to be expected. In any event, criminal prosecutions have
been difficult to obtain because of the requirement that the offense
be proved beyond a reasonable doubt.98 In addition to a higher stand-
ard of proof than that required for civil and administrative actions,
the subsiding interest of homeowners subsequent to removal of the
threat, coupled with the inconvenience of court delay, serves to cur-
tail criminal prosecutions. 99 Furthermore, the absence of an appreci-
able number of prosecutions may reflect reluctance to prosecute white-
collar crime.100 Although criminal sanctions may offer a modicum of
deterrence, they have little direct effect.
Another method of controlling blockbusting representations is
through licensing, either at the state or local level. Under this method,
real estate licenses would be subject to revocation or suspension if
the agent is engaged in blockbusting practices. However, these sanc-
tions do not seem effective when blockbusters act as speculators and
buy properties for resale. Moreover, real estate commissions are gen-
erally not appropriate policing agents because the personnel of most
commissions is composed principally of members of the real estate
industry or individuals dependent thereon, all of whom are under-
standably reluctant to act aggressively, if at all.101 In most cases
access to the commission by the general public is limited? °2 so there
may be little incentive for a commission to act in a manner antagonis-
tic to its real constituents, the realtors.
B..Control of Solicitations
An alternative and frequently complementary approach to block-
busting control consists of restraining uninvited solicitation. Realtors,
like peddlers and hawkers, often rely upon aggressive solicitation of
homeowners as a principal means of acquiring listings. Whether or
not it forms part of a larger pattern of blockbusting, frequent solicita-
fense in Illinois, the blockbuster is subject to imprisonment five times as long, and
a fine ten times as great, as for the first offense, up to $10,000 and/or five years.
ILL. STAT. ANN. § 70-52 (Smith-Hurd Supp. 1971).
98. Letter from James A. Bush, Detroit Commission on Community Relations,
Detroit, Mich., to author, January 6, 1971.
99. Id.
100. Blockbusting at 174.
101. Id. at 173.
102. D. MANDELKER, MANAGING OUR URBAN ENVIRONMENT 853 (1966).
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tion constitutes an invasion of the sanctity of the home, an annoyance
raising the need for state or local regulation. Regulation of uninvited
real estate solicitation may be imposed under an ordinance applicable
to all local door-to-door solicitors10 3 or under an anti-blockbusting
measure applicable only to real estate solicitors.
The Green River ordinances, so-called because of the first such
ordinance to be judicially tested and upheld, in Green River, Wy-
oming,' 04 generally prohibit all soliciations made without the prior
consent of the homeowner. A typical ordinance reads:
[T]he practice of going in and upon private residences in the city
of Alexandria, Louisiana by solicitors, peddlers, hawkers, itinerant
merchants or transient vendors of merchandise not having been
requested or invited to do so by the owner or owners, occupant or
occupants of said private residences, for the purpose of soliciting
orders for the sale of goods, wares and merchandise and or dis-
posing of and or peddling or hawking the same is declared to be
a nuisance and punishable as such nuisance as a misdemeanor.105
This ordinance was sustained by the United States Supreme Court
against constitutional objections in Breard v. City of Alexandria.1o6
103. Solicitation is generally deemed to be a matter of local concern because
different population densities yield different concentrations of solicitation efforts,
obviously more profitable in areas of greater density. However, in addition to
municipal controls, the federal government and the states have recently enacted
home solicitation laws, concerned not with the nuisance factor but with the con-
sumer protection aspect. The homeowner in the blockbusting episode can be
analogized to the consumer protected under these laws. In both situations the
victim succumbs to high pressure tactics employed against him in his own home.
However, the remedies under blockbusting statutes would be inadequate for the
homeowner because (1) the one-day grace period to rescind the contract would
be meaningless in light of the duration of a blockbusting episode and the fact
that a residence is generally not sold upon the first approach of the blockbuster,
i.e., there is time to reflect upon the contemplated sale; and (2) the unique
nature of real property would prohibit rescission where it has already been resold.
See, e.g., CONN. GE:N. STAT. ANN. ch. 740, §§ 42-134-42 (Supp. 1969); ILL. ANN.
STAT. ch. 121 1/2, § 262B (Smith-Hurd Supp. 1971); WASH. REv. Cona ANN.
§ 63.14.154 (Supp. 1970). The Federal Trade Commission also has proposed
regulation of "deceptive invasions of privacy through high pressure tactics." 16
C.F.R. 429 (1970). See also Meserve, The Proposed Federal Door-to-Door Sales
Act: An Examination of its Effectiveness as a Consumer Remedy and the Con-
stitutional Validity of its Enforcement Provisions, 37 GEO. WASH. L. Rav. 1171
(1969).
104. Green River v. Fuller Brush Co., 65 F.2d 112 (10th Cir. 1933).
105. Alexandria, La., Penal Ordinance No. 500, quoted in Breard v. City of
Alexandria, 341 U.S. 622, 624-25 (1951).
106. 341 U.S. 622 (1951).
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Since other methods of solicitation such as radio, periodicals, mail,
and local agencies remained open, and only one particular manner of
conducting business was prohibited, the court held that there was no
violation of due process by virtue of an unreasonable restraint on the
right to pursue a lawful occupation. 07 If the scope of such a law is so
limited, however, it is questionable how effectively it can curb block-
busting. True, it prevents face-to-face contact, which is probably the
blockbuster's most effective weapon, but it leaves the homeowner un-
protected from the deluge of phone calls and mailings commonly as-
sociated with blockbusting campaigns. Yet, measures adopted to com-
bat blockbusting which purport to prohibit all modes of solicitation
may be of dubious constitutionality because they might be construed to
restrain entirely the conduct of a lawful business.
Some Green River ordinances do not prohibit solicitation but re-
quire that solicitors obtain a municipal permit before engaging in
solicitation. 08 No doubt such ordinances would meet the due process
test propounded in Breard. Presumably all applicants are not granted
permits; if permits are awarded indiscriminantly, the ordinance serves
little function beyond the meager revenue that may be collected.
However, in the absence of specified criteria, denial of a solicitation
permit might very well yield a successful equal protection challenge.109
Outside the realm of constitutionality, Green River ordinances have
met a mixed fate in state courts in challenges to their validity.ll 0
Primary issues contested relate to the authority of municipalities to
enact such ordinances, and the possible existence of state preemption,
to be discussed below.
In light of the checkered acceptance of Green River ordinances,
they may be a poor choice as a means to curb real estate solicitation
comprising blockbusting patterns. In addition, courts have varied
widely in the classes of solicitors to be included under the proscription.
Although one court held such an ordinance applicable to realtors,"5
other courts have construed the ordinances strictly to exclude even
107. Id. at 632. Other constitutional objections rejected were based on the
commerce clause and the first amendment. The case involved the conviction of a
door-to-door salesman of nationally circulated magazines.
108. See, e.g., Mogolefsky v. Schoem, 50 N.J. 588, 236 A.2d 874 (1967).
109. Equal protection cases in the past have focused on the advantages con-
tended to accrue to local merchants by virtue of these ordinances. See Annot., 35
A.L.R.2d 355, 366 (1954).
110. Id. at 359.
111. Mogolefsky v. Schoem, 50 N.J. 588, 236 A.2d 874 (1967).
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insurance contracts, on the ground that they are not commodities sold
by merchants.1 2 It is not at all apparent that most courts would hold
Green River ordinances applicable to real estate brokers.
Usually, measures applicable only to real estate solicitation are
adopted to combat blockbusting; they appear in a variety of forms.
One municipal ordinance,"-' upheld in Summer v. Township of Tea-
neck,"1 requires the prospective solicitor to file a notice of intention
to solicit, indicating both the blocks to be canvassed and the dates on
which canvassing will take place. The validity of this ordinance was
challenged as exceeding the municipality's power to enact ordinances
because (1) the subject matter required uniform statewide treatment,
and (2) the subject matter had been preempted by the state. Inas-
much as the practice of blockbusting and the consequences thereof
vary from community to community, the court held it an appropriate
subject of municipal regulation."' On the issue of state preemption,
the court held that state licensing of realtors does not operate to im-
munize realtors from liability for misconduct, and does not preclude
municipalities from adopting measures to protect local inhabitants
from the misconduct of licensees." 6
Similar to the notice of intent to solicit requirement is the require-
ment of record-keeping of all solicitation efforts. Apparently such
ordinances were designed for the purpose of creating evidence for po-
tential blockbusting litigation or disciplinary proceedings rather than
to deter undesirable solicitations. However, it is likely that realtors
thus put on notice of government surveillance will forego improper
solicitation efforts, and deterrence may be a by-product.1 7 It is
112, Gregory v. Clausen, 78 S.D. 208, 99 N.W.2d 883 (1959).
113. Teaneck, N.J., Ordinance 1274 § II (1966). As is true of the permit or-
dinances, this ordinance is silent as to the consequences of such filing of notice,
i e., xhether permission to solicit might in certain instances be denied or whether
blanket permission is automatically awarded.
114. 53 N.J. 548, 251 A.2d 761 (1969).
115. Id. at 553, 251 A.2d at 764.
116. Id. at 555-56, 251 A.2d at 765-66. Accord, Mogolefsky v. Schoem, 50
N.J. 588, 236 A.2d 874 (1967). An earlier ruling by a lower court had held that
municipalities are barred from regulating state licensees. State v. Stockl, 85 N.J.
Super. 591, 205 A.2d 478 (Super. Ct. 1964). However, in Stockl, the municipality
had required realtors to obtain a municipal license and it is this activity which
was held to have been preempted by the state real estate commission. But see
Comment, Intergovernmental Conflict in the Regulation of Blockbusting Activities,
1971 URBAN LAW ANN. 212.
117. This assumption is implicit in Arizona Real Estate Board Regulation 30,
May 1, 1961, which declares that the use of high pressure tactics will subject the
realtor to strict surveillance.
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dearly within the competence of the real estate commission as the
licensing body to issue such a regulation, even though the authority
of the court to regulate the conduct of state licensees might be prob-
lematic outside the context of a consent decree. 18 The power of a
municipality to mandate the maintenance of records by realtors may
be limited where the municipality is precluded from regulating state
licensees, although this particular problem has not arisen in the
cases.
Another measure directed specifically to the problem of real estate
solicitation involves the prohibition of continued uninvited solicita-
tion after receipt of a request from the property owner to cease,"19 or
a list from a designated government agency of property owners who
do not wish to be solicited.120 Similarly, the anti-blockbusting law for
New York City establishes zones of non-solicitation for a period of one
year upon proof of the consistent occurrence of statutorily proscribed
representations in that area.121 Solicitation efforts by each realty firm
may actually be far from excessive. However, in a changing neighbor-
hood the homeowner is likely to experience excessive solicitation, be.
cause the urgency of black demand for housing creates intense compe-
tition among realtors to secure listings from the limited supply.2 2
118. MicH. STAT. ANN. § 26.1300 (411)(c) (1970); N.J. Real Estate Com-
mission Rule 26, December 1, 1963. In a consent order, a United States district
court ordered a realty company accused of blockbusting to record for all solicitation
attempts in the following year, the type of solicitation, the name, address, and race
of each homeowner solicited, the date, and the individual realtor involved. In
addition, for each sale or listing of residential property, the company was directed
to record the name, address, and race of both the seller and purchaser and to indi-
cate whether the sale or listing resulted from solicitation efforts of the company.
United States v. Stewart, Civ. No. 3-3589-A (N.D. Tex. 1970) (consent decree).
119. ILL. ANN. STAT. ch. 38, § 70-51(d) (Smith-Hurd Supp. 1971); Micst.
STAT. ANN. § 26.1300(203)(b) (1970); DETROIT, Miitr., CODE § 39-1-13.1(k)
(1968); Teaneck, N.J., Ordinance 1274 § III(h) (1966).
120. The Illinois scheme provides for notice to realtors by means of personal
notice by the homeowner and by the mailing of lists of homeowners who do not
wish to be solicited by the local Human Relations Council. ILL. ANN. STAT. ch.
38, § 70-51(d) (Smith-Hurd Supp. 1971).
121. LAws OF N.Y. ch. 493, tit. C, § C1-4.0 (May 8, 1970). In addition to
proof of illegal blockbusting practices, proof must also be presented to the human
rights commission that (1) belief in the representations commonly propounded by
blockbusters is thereby fostered; and (2) a temporary prohibition of solicitation
is necessary to prevent a material turnover in the area. The result of such an order
is similar to the effect of an injunction issued under the federal statute. See
United States v. Stewart, Civ. No. 3-3589-A (N.D. Tex. 1970) (consent decree).
122. Detroit Comm'n on Community Relations. Since this report was made,
the 1968 Federal Housing Law, 42 U.S.C. §§ 3601 et seq. (1970), was en-
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Because a number of realtors may be engaged in solicitation within
a particular neighborhood, the periodic issuance of lists to realtors123
is preferable to a system of personal notification inasmuch as the obli-
gation to notify all involved or potentially involved realtors may
place a substantial burden upon the homeowner.
Those absolute prohibitions of solicitation, applicable to mail, tele-
phone, telegraph, and other forms of contact as well as door-to-door
solicitation,12 4 may fail to meet the due process test of Breard since
they appear to restrain all forms of seeking business. This constitu-
tional objection may have been anticipated by the New York legisla-
tors because a proviso excludes "advertising in newspapers of general
circulation, magazines, radio, television, or telephone directories"125
from the definition of solicitation that may be prohibited. Whether
leaving these forms of solicitation available to the realtor is sufficient
to comply with due process in this context is yet to be seen, but clearly
the right to seek clients is not absolutely restrained under the New
York law.
As verbal communication comprises the essence of solicitation, first
amendment challenges to restraints on solicitation may be anticipated
under these laws because of the almost total denial of an opportunity
to communicate226 A recent case held that proscribing solicitation by
lawyers as nonprofessional conduct violates the first amendment.27
acted, so that the supply of housing available to blacks is ostensibly expanded and
the pressure thereby lifted from selected "changing neighborhoods." However,
realtors continue to be reluctant to "break" white neighborhoods and the pressure
on changing neighborhoods remains.
123. Reliance on the issuance of such lists presupposes the involvement of an
administrative agency.
124. The New York law definition of solicitation includes but is not limited to:
(a) going in or upon the property of the person to be solicited, except when
invited by such person;
(b) communicating with the person to be solicited by mail, telephone, telegraph
or messenger service, except when requested by such person;
(c) cavassing in streets or other public places;
(d) distributing handbills, circulars, cards or other advertising matter;
(e) using loudspeakers, soundtrucks, or other voice-amplifying equipment;
(f) displaying signs, poster, billboard, or other advertising devices other than
signs placed upon a real estate office for the purpose of identifying the
occupants and services provided therein.
LAws OF N.Y. ch. 493, tit. C., § 01-2 (May 8, 1970).
125. Id. The Michigan statute can be construed to exclude by implication these
forms of solicitation because it prohibits only solicitation by telephone, mail, or
personally. MICH. STAT. ANN. § 26.1300(203)(b) (1970).
126. See D. MANDELKER, MANAGING OUR URBAN ENVIRONMENT 852 (1966).
127. NAACP v. Button, 371 U.S. 415 (1963).
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Although this prohibition applied to interference with the "right to
assist persons seeking legal redress for infringements of constitutional
rights,"128 it is unlikely that interference with freedom of expression
would be treated differently, particularly in light of the preferred posi-
tion accorded first amendment freedoms in general. However, the
conduct of NAACP attorneys and that of blockbusters is distinguish-
able in that the former is regarded as socially useful whereas the latter
is viewed as socially dysfunctional. Again, the constitutional objec-
tions raised by the realtor can be met successfully by the exception
for commercial expressions.
Limiting or prohibiting the display of "for sale" or "sold" signs
on residential property by realtors in order to prevent the aura of
panic sales' 2 9 is, if not part of an outright prohibition of solicitation, a
restriction of alternative methods of communication, and thus within
the due process context of solicitation restrictions. However, resistance
to these measures has been most forceful. 30 There is some hint of
equal protection issues inasmuch as established, usually white, realtors
are able to maintain channels of communication with the community
for business purposes whereas less established realtors, including the
greater number of black realtors, lack the contacts and therefore are
significantly disadvantaged by their inability to use such signs. 13 ' Fur-
thermore, because of the advantaged position of the established brok-
ers, restraints on signs may tend to foster rather than retard dis-
criminatory housing patterns.
C. Control of Conduct
Legal restraints on representations and solicitations may fail to
penalize the more blatant blockbuster because the more vicious prac-
tices of hiring blacks to frighten whites and of subdividing homes into
boarding houses are, in effect, immunized from control in that they
involve neither solicitations nor representations. Although less prob-
lematic, constitutionally, than regulation of solicitations and repre-
sentations, very few measures reach these practices. Perhaps the most
inclusive measure has been incorporated in the anti-blockbusting ordi-
nance of Buffalo, New York, which prohibits inciting or
128. Id. at 428.
129. BUFFALO, N.Y., ORDINANCE ch. VII, art. XVIII, § 351(e) (1970);
DETROIT, MICH., CODE § 39-1-13.1(g)-(h) (Supp. 1968).
130. Letter from James A. Bush, Commission on Community Relations, Detroit,
Mich., to author, January 6, 1971.
131. Id.; Epstein interview.
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leading to the incitement of neighborhood unrest, community
tension or fear of racial, religious, nationality or ethnic changes
in any street, block, neighborhood or other area or otherwise
resort to or engage in any harassment, intimidation, threats or
practices as part of a process or pattern to induce or promote
the sale, listing for sale, leasing, assignment, transfer or other dis-
position of real property.'2
The Pennsylvania real estate regulation is not quite as broad; it
prohibits solicitation amounting to clear harassment of the home-
owner and "panic selling."' 13' Other measures forbid inciting com-
munity tension or creating a state of alarm with respect to neighbor-
hood transition.13
However, inasmuch as blockbusters have become more sophisticated,
relying on subtler techniques, it may be that conduct control is no
longer as important as it might have been at an earlier time. In place
of overt acts of harassment, blockbusters employ veiled representations
and selective showings. Although regulation of representations is
widespread where blockbusting is controlled, legal concern with selec-
tive showing has not begun to emerge on a large scale. Selective
showings involving the diversion of potential black purchasers from
white neighborhoods may be restricted by anti-discrimination laws,
particularly by provisions prohibiting representations that property is
unavailable when it is available; 1 ' however, it is unlikely to be held
that potential white purchasers are protected by anti-discrimination
laws. Furthermore, these statutes do not encompass the realtor who
makes no representations but fails to make the potential purchaser
aware of particular listings or who dissuades potential white pur-
chasers on the basis of neighborhood change.
Only a small number of laws have directed specific attention to
these problems.'- A unique, probably unconstitutional, solution has
recently been adopted in a small community in St. Louis County,
Missouri, requiring brokers to show each listing in that community
to at least one black and one white. 37 Even if upheld, its effectiveness
132. BUFFALO, N.Y., ORDINANCE ch. VII, art. XVIII, § 351(a) (1970).
133. Pa. Real Estate Co'mm'n Regulations 15.9, 15.10, September 22, 1966.
134. See ILL. ANN. STAT. ch. 38, § 70-51(c) (Smith-Hurd Supp. 1971);
ANNAPOLIS, MD., CODE § 8-3(a)(5)(b) (1970).
135. E.g., KAN. STAT. ANN. § 44-1016 (Supp. 1971); Wash. Dep't of Licenses
Regulation 308-124-170(e), April 16, 1968.
136. See MICH. STAT. ANN. § 26.1300(201)(e) (1970); BuFFALo, N.Y., OR-
DINANCE ch. VII, art. XVIII, § 351(d) (1970).
137. St. Louis Post-Dispatch, April 11, 1971, § A at 7, col. 1.
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seems limited because it can be so easily subverted by hiring whites for
a nominal fee to look at a residence.
IV. SUMMARY AND CONCLUSIONS
Blockbusting continues to be a reckless form of profiteering at the
expense of individuals and of society. Unfortunately, it has not been
made moot by the enactment of the federal Fair Housing Law and
other anti-blockbusting provisions at state and local levels. Although
compliance with these laws has in some places been substantial, 88
realtors continue to devise new means to accomplish their purposes.
A segregated housing market allows for the exaction of premiums 30
for desirable housing with consequent inflated commissions for the
realtor. By selling only to blacks in a white neighborhood, block-
busters stimulate the "tipping point" to induce a rapid exodus of
whites and an acceleration of commissions. Because of these financial
gains, compliance with regulatory measures has been only formal;
conforming behavior has tended to constitute a refinement of tech-
nique rather than an abandonment of the practice. The ingenuity
shown by blockbusters in evading anti-blockbusting laws indicates
that these laws must be constantly re-evaluated and refashioned to
encompass all the evolving variants of this destructive process.
138. See, e.g., letter from James A. Bush, Commission on Community Rela-
tions, Detroit, Mich., to author, January 6, 1971.
139. According to one view, blacks pay a premium to escape the ghetto and
move into white neighborhoods. Another view holds that whites pay a premium
commensurate with distance from blacks. See A. Pascal, The Analysis of Resi-
dential Segregation, Oct. 1969.
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